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AFTERWORD
ADDRESSING THE ELEPHANT: THE
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE PATENT
CASES PILOT PROGRAM AND LEAHYSMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT
THE HONORABLE RANDALL R. RADER*

INTRODUCTION

Recently, I have seen several big-budget television commercials
invoke patents while marketing their goods. The general public's
recognition of the importance of patents to innovation and our
economy is perhaps at an all-time high. Many factors probably drive
this increased awareness, including our daily dependence on modern
technology and media coverage of high-profile litigations and patent
acquisitions.
This increased attention has implications as well in the legal world.
For those of us embedded within the patent system, we are
experiencing a very important shift in the perception and operation
of our discipline. For instance, many of the more prominent
jurisdictions for patent trials are implementing local rules allowing
uniform, fast, and cost-effective discovery and case development. The
Patent Cases Pilot Program' is similarly starting to influence the
processes and efficiency of patent litigation with a heightened
expertise in our already-marvelously-competent trial judges. Of
course, the elephant in the room regarding changes to patent law
and litigation is the enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents
* Chief Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. I would like
to thank Jim Hughes and Stefani Meyer for üieir assistance in preparing this Afterword.
I. Pub. L. No. 111-349,124 Stat. 3674 (2011).
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(AIA). MTiile the full impact of these changes—mostly
procedural in nature—remain to be seen, a statement of our
expectations for these changes at this point may well help assess the
degree of change achieved by this legislation. Therefore, at this
point of embarkation for the AIA and the advent for the Patent Pilot
Program, I will briefly look at the potential for change in both district
court patent litigation and Patent Office review of issued patents.
THE PATENT PILOT PROGRAM

The Patent Pilot Program ("Program"), about a year-and-half old
now, has several intriguing levers for patent litigation development.
Congress created this ten-year pilot project with the goal of
increasing U.S. district court judge expertise and efficiency in
adjudicating patent cases. In operation, the Program funnels patent
cases to interested judges in a select number of district courts. When
a patent case is filed in a participating district court, the case is
initially assigned randomly to a judge in the district, independent of
the list of judges who have volunteered to hear patent cases. If the
case falls to a judge who is not participating in the program, that
judge may decline to accept the case. The declining decision triggers
a random reassignment to one of the volunteers to hear patent cases."*
Each of the pilot districts has its own case assignment rules. Typically,
non-participating judges have thirty days to decline a randomly
assigned patent case. Some districts give only seven days to elect
reassignment.
A district qualified for the Program based on the court's
experience or interest in patent cases. Eligibility was predicated on
the district's ranking as one of the top fifteen districts with the largest
number of patent and plant variety protection cases filed in 2010, or
on the district's adoption of (or intent to adopt) local patent rules.
For context, the year 2010 saw the filing of just over three thousand
patent cases."* Ten district courts accounted for about fifty-four
percent of these cases.^
2. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 28
and 35 U.S.C).
3. Patent Cases Pilot Program § l(a)(l).
4. Si« Jason Rantanen, Patent Suit Filings far 2010 Show a Slight Rise, PATENTLYO
(Jan. 27, 2011), http://\vww.patenüyo.com/patent/20n/01/patent-suit-filings-for2010-show-a-slight-raise.htm! (stating that there were 3,605 patent cases filed in 2010).
5.

See OmcE OF JUDGES PROGRAM, ADMIN. OmCE OF THE U.S. COURI:S, JUDICIAL

BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 190,

tbl.C-11 (2011), available at http://w\v\v.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudiciaIBusiness
/2010/JudicialBusinespdiVersion.pdf; Dennis Crouch, Goncentration of Patent Gases in tfw
Eastern District of Texas, PATENTL\O (Apr. 18 2011, 2:40 PM), h ttp://w\vw. pate ntlyo.com
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The Program intentionally included both larger and smaller
district courts from at least three different judicial circuits. Congress
instructed the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts to make selections from two cohorts after establishing a
pool of interested, eligible district courts. The first statutory category
demanded at least three district courts with a minimum of ten
authorized district judgeships and at least three interested judges.^
The statute also demanded at least three district courts with fewer
than ten authorized district judgeships and at least two interested
judges.'
Fourteen district courts were selected to participate in the
Program. These include districts with well-known patent activity such
as the Eastern District of Texas and three of the California districts.
District courts with developing patent activity, such as the District of
Nevada and the Western District of Tennessee, were also selected.*
Finally, the statute calls for a midterm and a final report to
Congress. These reports will analyze the increase in judicial expertise
and the efficiency of patent cases. Specifically, the reports will
compare volunteering judges and non-volunteering judges on both
their rate of reversal on claim construction and substantive patent law
and their time to trial or entry of summary judgment. Additionally,
the reports will discuss any evidence indicating that litigants chose
the participating district courts in an attempt to secure a given
outcome and will also analyze the merits of extending the program to
all district courts.
The Program's structure presents some interesting issues of
potential forum selection, transfer, and joinder. The judges who
have volunteered to take patent cases are known in each participating
district. Therefore, if litigants acquire an accurate sense of the nonparticipating judges who are likely to decline patent cases, they may
feel they can also acquire assignment of their case to a judge uniquely
interested in their dispute.
/patent/201 l/04/concentration-of-patent<ases-in-the-eastem-district-of-texas.html (listing
the most popularjurisdictions for patent cases in 2010).
6. District Courts Selected fyr Patent Pilot Program, U.S. GOURTS (June 7, 2011),

http://www.uscourts.gOv/News/NewsView/l 1-0 6-07/District_Gourts_Selected_for_
Patent_Pilot_Program.aspx.
7. Id.
8. Id. The full list of district courts selected for the Program in 2010 included
the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, the Western District of Pennsylvania,
the District of New Jersey, the District of Maryland, the Northern District of Illinois,
the Southern District of Florida, the District of Nevada, the Eastern and Northern
Districts of Texas, the Western District of Tennessee, and the Gentral, Northern, and
Southern Districts of Galifomia. See id.
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The AIA's new joinder statute in the context of the Program may
also drive changes in litigation patterns. The AIA's new joinder
provision states that a plaintifF may not join accused infringers in one
action based "solely on allegations that they each have infringed the
patent or patents in suit."^ This provision took effect in the initial
wave of the AIA changes on September 16, 2011. On the day before,
district courts saw the largest number of patent cases filed in recent
history.'^ Over fifty cases were filed accusing over eight hundred
entities of patent infringement." The average complaint that day
accused more than sixteen entities of infringement.'^ These filings
were in Une with the trend, at that time, of accusing increasing
numbers of parties in a single suit.'^ For comparison, in the months
before this spike, only ten to twenty cases were filed each day.'**
Some commentators expect the new joinder rules, combined with
a perception that the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has elevated its scrutiny of denials to transfer venue, will
create a change in patent litigation strategies.'^ Will this change
direct more cases to district courts participating in the Program?
Preliminary indications suggest that parties have selected a filing
forum based on a district court's participation in the Program.'^
Moreover, district courts themselves consider participation in the
Program when evaluating motions to transfer.'^ The Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation has also considered the Program when
9. 35 U.S.C. § 299(b) {Supp. V 2012).
10. Rush to Judgment: Neiu Dis-Joinder Rules and Non-Practicing Fntities, PATENTLYO
(Sept. 20, 2011, 2:10 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/20n/09/rush-tojudgment-new-dis-joinder-rules-and-non-practicing-enti ties.html.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Susan Decker, Apple, Google Targeted in Surge Before Patent Laxu Changes,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 12, 2011, 6:37 PM), http://mv\v.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0912/apple-google-targeted-as-patent-ca5es-surge-before-Iaw-changes.html.
14. See Rush to Judgment, supra note 10 (providing a chart of the number of patent
cases filed in the preceding months).
15. SeefnreTSTech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1Ô. Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Harris Corp., No. 9C820, 2012 U.S. Dist LEXIS
52663, at *9-10 (N.D. III. Apr. 16, 2012) ("[Plaintiff] asserts that it elected to file suit
in the Northern District of Illinois on account of this district's . . . participation in the
Patent Pilot Program . . . . [T] he expediency of patent discovery and trials promoted
by the Patent Pilot Program is a material consideration for many patent plaintiffs,
and will not be discounted."); Venue Implicatiom of the Patent Pilot Program, LAW 360
(Oct. 29, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/389793/venueimplications-of-the-patent-pilot-program.
17. Compression Tech. Solutions LLC v. EMC Corp., No. 4:11CV1579, 2012 WL
1188576, at *9 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2012) ("When considering the question of 'judicial
economy,' the Court notes the following. The Northern District of California is
familiar with patent litigation. Indeed, it was . . . selected in June 2011 to be in
Patent Pilot Program [which] 'is intended to improve the adjudication of patent
disputes.'"); Venue Iviplications of the Patent Pilot Program, supranote 16.
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determining consolidation of a multidistrict infringement action.'*
The Program's influence on venue transfer is a significant developing
trend in patent litigation. The future promises cooperation between
bench and bar to find venues that best suit the convenience of parties
and the logical distribution of patent cases.
POST ISSUANCE PATENT OFFICE REVIEW UNDER THE AIA

The AIA touches on two types of third-party initiated Patent Office
review of issued patents: post-grant review (PGR) and inter partes
review (IPR). Congress responded to criticisms that the previous
inter partes reexamination procedures devolved into a slow litigation
supplement rather than an efficient litigation alternative. Thus, these
new procedures hope to achieve a swifter, cost-efficient alternative to
litigation. Of course, that hope may rely on some hopeless
assumptions.
In any event, PGR provides a new procedure for third party
challenges to issued patents within a nine-month window from
issuance.'^ The available grounds of PGR are generally broader than
IPR, which is focused on printed publications. The scope and
immediate review of the PGR process may make it particularly
attractive to close competitors. Close competitors often track each
other's patent applications as they move through the Patent Office.
If these competitors continue this tracking and see advantages in an
early challenge to validity, PGR will allow challenges shordy after
issuance without district court litigation. This process may thereby
reduce costs to entities with sophisticated patent management
programs. With that advantage in mind, the PGR presents the
prospect of changes in patent portfolio management strategies. If
PGR operates efficiently, will competitors feel a need to devote more
resources to monitoring patent issuance? And, in the event of
increased monitoring, will entities face more liability when litigation
occurs, either due to willfulness infringement doctrines or due to jury
perception that the litigation might have been avoided with a simple
hcense? In addition, how will sophisticated patent managers
integrate PGR procedures into their current interplay with related
companies in international opposition proceedings?
PGR's effect on district court litigation presents another layer of
18. See, e.g.. In re Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., Patent Litig., 867 F. Supp. 2d
1333, 1335-36 (J.P.M.L. 2012) ("We are of the view that the Western District of
Pennsylvania is an appropriate transferee district . . . [it] is participating in the
national Patent Pilot Program . . . .").
19. 35U.S.C. §321 (c) (Supp. V 2012).
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complexity. For instance, patentees might delay filing infringement
actions based on newly issued patents to avoid PGR challenges. On
the other side of this equation, potential infringers may view the
nine-month window as leverage for negotiating a favorable license
agreement in lieu of a PGR challenge. The PGR period may also
delay or adversely affect the value of a patent as a vehicle to seek
venture capital for a new venture. The market may discount a new
patent's contribution to a patent portfolio during this nine-month
window. Indeed, the PGR period may evolve into an extended
examination period that increases costs and uncertainties without
much promise of supplying an efficient litigation alternative.
While it is too soon to predict the efFect of PGR on patent
valuation, licensing, and enforcement, PGR is certain to affect the
internal business and legal practices of many entities with significant
patent portfolios. Nonetheless, the statute phases in eligibility of
issued patents for PGR review. As a result, the PGR process will not
swing into full action until patents filed under the AIA's new "first-tofile" regime start to issue, meaning a period around 2015 to 2018.^*^
Thus, the statute gives patentees, their competitors, and the Patent
Office time to establish expectations and internal procedures to
accommodate this new PGR process.
The second new litigation-related Patent Office review process is
IPR.^' IPR took effect on September 16, 2012 and replaces the
previous inter partes reexamination practice.^^ This process presents
a few differences worth noting between the use and potential effect
of IPR, PGR, and district court litigation. First, the Patent Office
could initially see more IPR petitions compared to inter partes
reexamination requests.
Unlike the previous inter partes
reexamination, the new IPR process does not exclude patents issued
from applications filed before November 29, 1999, thus increasing
the universe of patents eligible for IPR. IPR, however, will have
limitations. For instance, it is not generally available during the
window when PGR is an option for a third party challenger. Of
course, with PGR still in a phasing-in period, this limitation may have
little immediate effect.
Additionally, the IPR process includes a requirement that the
petitioner may only trigger an institution with a showing of a
"reasonable likelihood of prevailing" rather than a "substantial new
20. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(n), 125 Stat. 284,
293 (2011).
21. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-318 (Supp. V 2012).
22. SeeS5 U.S.C. §§ 311-318 (2006).
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question of patentability" (SNQ) that prevailed under the old
reexamination statute.^^
This new standard may create an
uncertainty for third-party challengers. Yet, the AIA actually
implemented this new "reasonable likelihood" threshold standard,
effective September 16, 2011, in the previous inter partes
reexamination procedure.^'* Under the SNQ standard, the Patent
Office granted about ninety-five percent of inter partes
reexamination requests. Once again, it is too soon to predict if this
new standard will reduce the number of issued patents further
reviewed by the Patent Office. At least one study, however, shows that
requests for reexamination under the new "reasonable likelihood"
standard were initially granted at rates similar to the previous
standard.^^ However, this initial rate and practice has yet to undergo
scrutiny in the courts.
Third parties will also face new strategic issues when contemplating
an IPR petition. The IPR process has various ramifications regarding
district court litigation stays, joinder of additional parties, and the
scope of available discovery for the proceeding. Finally, even if the
Patent Office sees an explosion in IPR petitions, it will enjoy the
discretion to limit the number of IPR petitions granted during each
of the first four years of implementation. The Patent Office has the
discretion to limit the number of IPR petitions granted to the
number of reexamination requests granted in 2010.^^
When IPR replaced inter partes reexamination last September, the
latest reexamination trends showed strong interest in the old
procedure. After an iriitial slow start, interest in inter partes
reexamination grew quickly. Starting from just a few requests per
year in the early part of the last decade, more than 375 requests were
filed in 2011. To be sure, commentators had concerns with some
aspects of the previous reexamination process.^^ First, there was the
time to completion; the inter partes reexamination process took the
Patent Office an average of three years to complete. Some
practitioners also perceived that the chance of obtaining a litigation
stay varied widely between district court jurisdictions.
This
combination of concurrent district court litigation and
23. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 6(c) (3) (A) (ii).
24. 35 U.S.C. §314(a).
25. Marian Flattry & William Raich, Tempest in a Teapot? An Evaluation of the
Heightened Standard for Initiating Inter Partes Reexamination and Implications for Inter
Partes Review, 83 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. 795 (2012).
26. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 6(c) (2) (B).
27. See Robert G. Sterne et al., Reexamination Practice with Goncurrent District Gourt
Litigation or Section 337 USITG Investigations, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 115 (2010).

1112

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1105

reexamination complicated the decision to enter the administrative
regime. Sixty-seven percent of inter partes reexamination requests
filed since the start of the procedure in 1999 focused on patents
involved in litigation.^^ In 2011, that ratio increased to over seventy-five
percent.^ Further, the same patent often prompted multiple
reexaminations. Between 2000 and 2010, slighdy over 2500 unique
patents were involved in over 5600 reexamination proceedings.^** Over
ten percent of those unique patents were reexamined more than
once.^' Some patents were reexamined two, three, or even more
times—one was submitted to six reexaminations^^—presumably
because these patents were perceived as valuable. While these multiple
reexamination numbers include both inter partes and ex parte
reexamination—^where between seventy-five and ninety percent of ex
parte reexaminations were initiated by a third party—it is clear that
litigation concerns helped drive activity in the administrative arena.
Entities concerned with infringement allegations had motivation to
initiate inter partes reexamination, as historically only eleven percent
of issued certificates confirmed patentability of all claims.^^
This backdrop led to attacks on the previous inter partes
reexamination practice for allegedly increasing costs as a litigation
supplement rather than reducing costs as a litigation alternative.
Independent of the merits of these concerns, participants and
observers of the patent system will have plenty to contemplate as
patentees, patent challengers, and the Patent Office operate within the
AIA's new post-issuance challenge procedures.
This brief Afterword only allows for a quick overview of a few
examples of the changes that are occurring in the world of patent
litigation and enforcement. Of course, the success of these programs
and initiatives depends on their ability to supply faster, cheaper, and
more predicable outcomes for patent disputes. Moreover, keeping in
mind that the patent system's goal is to "promote the progress of
science and the useful arts," the real key to success is not litigation
efficiency, but technology growth and application.
28.

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OmcE, INTER FARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA

(2012), auoiíaiZíaí http:/Avww.uspto.gov/patents/stats/IP
quarterly 7report
2012.pdf.
r ö r
-M
- Klune
^ _30_
29. See Jason Rantanen, Inter Partes Reexam Requests Continue To Rise, for Noiu,
PATEI^TLYO (Dec. 15, 2011, 12:19 PM), http://w\vw.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/12/re-

exam-requests<ontinue-to-rise.html (discussing the rise of inter partes reexamination
requests over the past decade).
30. Sterne et al., supra note 27, at 162-65.
31. Id.
32. Id. (referencing U.S. Patent No. 5,425,051).
33.

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 28.

Copyright of American University Law Review is the property of American University
Washington College of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or
posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users
may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

